Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 44
Number 4 Summer
Student Edition

Article 3

January 2016

What Does Climate Justice Look Like for the Environmentally
Displaced in a Post Paris Agreement Environment - Political
Questions and Court Deference to Climate Science in the Urgenda
Decision
Jeremy M. Bellavia

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
Jeremy M. Bellavia, What Does Climate Justice Look Like for the Environmentally Displaced in a Post
Paris Agreement Environment - Political Questions and Court Deference to Climate Science in the
Urgenda Decision, 44 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 453 (2016).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

WHAT DOES CLIMATE JUSTICE LOOK LIKE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTALLY
DISPLACED IN A POST PARIS AGREEMENT ENVIRONMENT? POLITICAL
QUESTIONS AND COURT DEFERENCE TO CLIMATE SCIENCE IN THE URGENDA
DECISION

Jeremy M Bellavia*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Environmentally induced migration is not new to the pattern of biological
migration on earth.' Human migration has ebbed and flowed in response to
conflict, environmental changes, and resource scarcity throughout time. For
generations people moved in search of "better land, milder climate, and easier
living conditions."
Today, communities are continuing this trend.3 What has
changed, however, is the human influence from greenhouse gas ("GHG")
emissions on the climate. 4
Anthropogenic climate change is having an
unprecedented and varied effect on the environment leading to slow-onset disasters

*Jeremy M. Bellavia is a third year law student at the University of Denver Sturm College
of Law. The
author is also a member of both the International Law Society and the Foreign Direct Investment Moot
Team.
1. Guy Gugliotta, The Great Human Migration: Why human left their African homeland 80,000
years,

ago

to

colonize

the

world,

SMITHSONIANMAG.COM

(July

2008),

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-great-human-migration- 1356 1/?no-ist.
2. Etienne Piguet, From "Primitive Migration" to "Climate Refugees": The Curious Fate of the
NaturalEnvironment in Migration Studies, 103 ANNALS. ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS. 148-162 (2012),
available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00045608.2012.6962
(quoting Ellen
Churchill Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, on the basis of Ratzel 's system of anthropogeography (New York :H. Holt and co., 1911)); (for more studies of historical migration due to climate
see Ellsworth Huntington, Civilization and climate (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni., Press, 1922)).
3. Ellsworth Huntington, Changes of Climate and History, 18 AM. HiST. REV. 213 (Jan. 1913),
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1835325?origin=crossref, (the relative stability of the
earth's climate over the last 10,000 years has been marked with period "pulses" of instability. This
author explains that these "pulses" have enabled the rise and led to the demise of civilizations. e.g., The
Maya, Rome, Egypt, Greece); see also U.N. Environment Programme, Livelihood Security: Climate
Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel, 22 (Dennis Hamro-Drotz & United Nations Environment

Programme eds., 2011), (motivated by the variable climate of the Sahel region in Africa, herders,
farmers, and even laborers have long history of seasonal migration patterns engrained in their culture.
Migration in this region is a coping strategy to diversify resource generation in a variable environment).
4. See Stephanie C. Herring et al., Explaining Extreme Events of 2014 from a Climate
Perspective, supplement to 96 BuLL. AMER. METEOR. SOC. SI-S172 (Dec. 2015),
https ://www2.ametsoc.org/ams/index.cfin/publications/bulletin-of-the-american-meteorologicalsociety-bams/explaining-extreme-events-from-a-climate-perspective/table-of-contents/high-resolutionversion/; see also Causes of Climate Change, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wmo.int/pages/themes/climate/causes of climate change.php, (last visited Apr. 5, 2016)
(anthropogenic climate change is human caused climate change).
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(e.g., flooding, increased extreme weather events, droughts, rising ocean levels). 5
The slow-onset environmental degradation caused by climate change
6 disrupts
livelihoods, creates food insecurity, and exacerbates resource inequality.
In developing countries and where people are heavily dependent on natural
resources for survival, individuals are more vulnerable to climate change because
they often lack the resources to successfully adapt. 7 Small Island Developing
States ("SIDS") are home to some of the most vulnerable individuals, who have
nowhere to go in the case of a climate change related disaster. 8 In other regions
where vulnerable individuals have the resources to migrate, the environmentally
displaced migrate to urban areas within their home country as a result of the slowonset effects of climate change. 9 Increasing migration into urban areas strains
local infrastructure and increases competition for natural resources, creating social
unrest and political instability.' 0 Strict immigration policies accompanying the
modem geopolitics of state sovereignty and the growing trend of border
externalization" severely limit legitimate methods of migration. These policies
leave those displaced by climate change to the risky channels of irregular
migration, crossing sovereign borders illegally. 12
Developed states are the largest historic contributors to climate change, and
3
are not immune to the effects. 1 During the Conference of Parties 21 ("COP21,,),14

5. Christopher B. Field et al., Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2014: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Part A: Global and Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 7 Cambridge Univ. Press,
(2014) (Regions will be impacted positively and negatively).
6. Stephane Hallegatte et al., Bad Seed: Climate Change, Agriculture, and Food Security, in
Shock Waves: Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty, 49, 65 (Nov. 2015), available at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doiibook/10.1596/978-1-4648-0673-5.
7. Thomas Schueneman, Blog Action Day: Poverty and Climate Change, GLOBAL WARMING 1S
REAL, 2 (Oct. 15, 2008), available at http://globalwarmingisreal.com/2008/10/15/blog-action-daypoverty-and-climate-change/.
8. Climate Change Secretariat, Climate Change Small Island Developing States, U.N.
2
(2005),
Climate
Change
Convention
on
Framework
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/cc-sids.pdf.
9. Ivan Campbell et al., Climate change and conflict-Lessons from community conservancies in
northern Kenya 7 (Conservation Development Centre, International Institute for Sustainable
Development and Saferworld , Nov. 2009).
10. Colin P. Kelley et al., Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implicationsof the recent
Syrian drought, 112 Proc. Nat'l. Acad. Sci. 3241, 3242, 3245 (2015), available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/1 12/11/3241?tab-author-info., (referring to a nearly 50% increased urban
population in Syria between 2002 and 2010, as a contributor to the country's destabilization).
11. Maribel Casas-Cortes et al., Changing Borders, Rethinking Sovereignty: Towards A Right to
available at
47,
48-9
(2015),
Interdiscip.
Mobil.
Hum.
Migrate, 23
Rev.
http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=Sl 980-85852015000100047&script--sciarttext&tlng=es.
12. Key

Migration

Terms,

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

FOR

MIGRATION,

https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#1rregular-migration (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) (defined as:
Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries).
13. Edward Cameron, Tara Shine & Wendi Bevins, Climate Justice: Equity and Justice
Informing a New ClimateAgreement, 8 (World Res. Inst & Mary Robinson Foundation-Climate Justice,
2013),
Paper,
Working
http://pdf.wri.org/climate justice-equityandjustice-informinga new climate agreement.pdf
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the event that lead to the adoption of the Paris Agreement ("PA"), President of the
United States Barack Obama said, "[w]e know the truth that many nations have
contributed little to climate change but will be the first to feel its most destructive
effects." 15 Developed countries are experiencing the costly market and non-market
impacts of climate change, yet they have not taken the lead in drastically reducing
emissions.1 6 Highly populated coastal cities in the U.S. are experiencing17 the effects
of storm surges, as well as impacts to marine and wetland eco-systems.
The efforts of individual states are not enough to stem the negative impact of
climate change. Because climate change is global, it requires an international
response. Prior to the adoption of the PA, the international treaty governing the
stabilization of the climate through reduction of global GHG emissions was the8
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC").'
The Convention on Climate Change sets forth an overall framework for
intergovernmental efforts to tackle the challenge posed by climate change. 19 The
UNFCCC recognizes that the climate system is a shared resource whose stability is
affected
by industrial and other emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
2
gases. 0
The PA was adopted under the UNFCCC in December 201521, and is the first
international environmental agreement ever to reference human rights. 22 The
adoption of the PA followed two decades of capacity building, awareness, and
research.23 The PA was signed by 196 parties and became the first multilateral

(Developed countries contributed 70% of GHG emissions since 1950. Drastic reduction in global GHG
emissions are necessary to stabilize climate change).
14. Parties to the Convention and Observer States, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE

http://unfccc.int/parties and observers/parties/items/2352.php (the COP represents the
decision making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. All 195
countries in the world are either Parties or members to the Convention).
15. Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama at the First Session of COP21, 4 (Nov. 30,
2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201 5/11 /30/remarks-president-obama-first-sessioncop21 (President Obama expressed support at the opening of the COP21).
16. Robert Mendelsohn, Climate Change and Economic Growth, 9 (Comm'n on Growth & Dev.,
Working Paper No. 60, 2009), https://environment.yale.edu/files/biblio/YaleFES-00000397.pdf.
CHANGE,

17. Climate Impacts

on

Coastal Areas, U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

AGENCY,

http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts/coasts.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
18. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, S.Treaty Doc. 102-38,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
19. The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON

http://unfccc.int/essentialbackground/convention/items/2627.php (last visited Apr.
5,2016).
20. Id.
21. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 21st session,
Nov. 30- Dec. 11, 2015, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec.
12, 2015) [hereinafter UNFCCC]
22. Annalisa Savaresi, The Paris Agreement: An Equity Perspective, BENELEX BLOG, 5 (Jan.
CLIMATE CHANGE,

29, 2016), available at
equity-perspective.

http://www.benelexblog.law.ed ac.uk/2016/O1/29/the-paris-agreement-an-

23. UNFCCC, supranote 21, at 1-32.
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environmental agreement referencing parties' obligations to human rights.2 4 Once

fifty-five parties responsible for fifty-five percent of global GHG emission ratify
the treaty, the agreement will come into force.2 5 The PA will commit parties to
their National Determined Contributions ("NDC"). 26 NDCs have the goal of
keeping global temperatures below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levels.27 The PA may bind parties to their voluntary commitments, but there is no
enforcement or dispute settlement mechanism in the PA, nor does the PA provide
procedural rights. 28 Accordingly, while the PA represents a step forward in
addressing climate change, it does contain problematic enforcement gaps.
In the 2014 report "Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate
Disruption," the International Bar Association ("IBA") made over fifty
recommendations to strengthen climate change justice. 29 This report was a
measure of the global awareness of climate change and provided that "climate
justice links human rights and development to achieve a human-centered approach,
safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable people and sharing the burdens and
benefits of climate change impacts equitably and fairly." 30 The IBA report
gaps related to
discussed the role that arbitration can play to fill the enforcement
31
the PA and influence international law related to climate change.
Businesses also play an important role in climate
such, litigation and arbitration may present important
mitigation. The scope of this paper is limited to the
generally and the potential role of arbitration.33 Because

change mitigation.3 2 As
tools in climate change
state of climate justice
domestic legislatures are

24. Savaresi, supra note 22, at 5.
25. UNFCCC, supra note 21, at art. 21.
26. UNFCCC, supra note 21, at art. 4.
27. UNFCCC, supra note 21, at art. 2.
28. UNFCCC, supra note 21, at art. 23 (NDCs are reviewed every five years and published by the
secretariat. Those who violate their obligations are named and shamed).
29. David Estrin & Baroness Helena Kennedy, Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of
Climate Disruption,Report, INTL. BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE & HUMAN
available
at
2014),
26-31
(July
RIGHTS
3,
http://www.ibanet.org/PresidentialTaskForceCCJHR2014.aspx.
30. Principles

of Climate Justice, MARY

ROBINSON

FOUNDATION-CLIMATE

JUSTICE

1,

http://www.mrfcj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Principles-of-Climate-Justice.pdf.
31. David W. Rivkin & Roger Martella, COP21:Climate Change Related Disputes: A Role for
InternationalArbitration and ADR, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION 1-14 (Dec. 7, 2015), available

http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=4c321 f4e-315b-40be-a553at
5b55da5l3ede (the President of the IBA said that arbitration can provide certainty of contract with
respect to state or industry imposed climate change objectives and targets).
32. Press Release, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Yale University Report
Reveals Rapidly Growing Reality of Climate Action (Dec. 4, 2015) ("Yale analyzed over 10,000
climate commitments made by cities, regions, businesses and investors, many involving the cooperation
of national governments, who formally recorded their pledges in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate
Action (NAZCA) and under the banner of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA).").
33. Mitigating GHG emissions requires more than creation and enforcement of domestic
legislation and arbitration is likely to play an important role. See COP21: Climate Change Related
Disputes: A Role for International Arbitration and ADR, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION supra

note 31, at 14. Arbitration provides for a flexible and delocalized (non-national) adjudicative
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still slow to respond to the urgent situation presented by climate change, and the
PA lacks enforcement mechanisms, litigation can be used to hold countries
34
June 2015 marked
responsible for their GHG emissions reduction commitments.
35
In June 2015, in Urgenda
a potential turning point for climate related litigation.
v. Staat, a Dutch court ruled that the Netherlands has a "systemic responsibility"
within its territory to reduce GHG emissions to the established national target, and
36
This decision represents an
that it was not on path to meeting that target.
important contribution to international jurisprudence relating to climate change
mitigation. 3 7 The sections below will discuss this decision and others.
This paper discusses the role of climate justice to mitigate climate change
following the PA. Section II briefly discusses the effects of climate change on
global peace and security and the gaps current international instruments leave in
protecting the environmentally displaced. Section III discusses the significance of
the Urgenda decision and its potential as a model for climate justice in pending
and future cases.

mechanism to resolve disputes, and is governed by rules expressed in the parties' agreement to arbitrate.
This flexible dispute resolution mechanism can be designed by the parties to include third parties (e.g.,
NGOs, and non-parties to the dispute) and can add to the efficacy of climate justice. Akhlaq Choudhury
& Khaled Moyeed, Spotlight on InternationalArbitrationas a Means of Settling Disputes Arisingfrom
26,
2016,
KLUWER
ARBITRATION
BLOG
Jan.
Climate
Change,
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/01/26/spotlight-on-international-arbitration-as-a-means-ofsettling-disputes-arising-from-climate-change/. Arbitration can helpful for private and public actors in
mitigating climate change. The UNFCCC anticipated and included for the development of arbitral
procedures related to climate disputes in art 14 (b). U.N., UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, art. 14(b), U.N. Docs. FCCC/INFORMAIJ84 (1992) (Arbitration procedures
have not yet been adopted by the UNFCCC). Arbitration is already being used by the global trade and
development sectors and will continue to be used as more low carbon investments are made. See
Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR), CERES, http://www.ceres.org/investor-network/incr (last
visited July 15, 2016). The INCR comprises of at least 120 institutional investors, managing $14 trillion
committed to invest in low-carbon opportunities. The INCR Policy Working Group engages with
domestic policymakers and international investor groups to promote stable economic returns. Climate
and Energy Policy, CERES, http://www.ceres.org/investor-network/incr/climate-and-energy-policy (last
visited July 15, 2016). Support for arbitration to resolve multiparty disputes involving investment and
commercial claims relating to climate change mitigation is growing, and includes the international Bar
Association. International Bar Association Climate Change Justice & Human Rights Task Force Report,
Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption 117-153 (2014).
34. The Hague Dist. Ct., The Hague, 24 juni 2015, 7196 m.nt (Urgenda/Staat) (Neth.) (The
Urgenda decision discussed below was filed by the Urgenda group against the Government of the
Netherlands. The lawsuit claimed that the Dutch government failed to effectively reduce GHG
emissions to levels necessary to stabilize C02 levels. The lawsuit cited multiple international
obligations in which the Netherlands committed to this stabilization by GHG emission reduction).
35. Id. at 2 (June 2015 is when the Urgenda decision was finalized) [hereinafter Urgenda v.
Staat]
36. Id. at 34.
37. Roger Cox, A Climate Change Litigation Precedent Urgenda v The State of the Netherlands,
13-14
(Nov.
2015),
No.
79
1,
CIGI
Papers
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigipaper 79.pdf.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

II.

VOL. 44:4

A. CLIMATE CHANGE IS A THREAT MULTIPLIER, INCREASING
POVERTY, AND DESTABILIZING FRAGILE STATES

Before discussing the state of climate justice, it is important to first
understand the challenges posed by climate change with respect to global peace
and security, and the devastating impact climate change can have on the global
population. Climate change strains economic growth, erodes food security, and
increases poverty. 38 The earth's climate will not stabilize even if anthropogenic
emissions of GHG are stopped, the negative effects associated with climate change
will continue to affect local populations for centuries. 39 Continued global
population growth means that an increasing number of people will be vulnerable to
climate change, (e.g. more people are living in low lying coastal areas vulnerable
to sea level rise).40
Policies of colonialism and neoliberal trade created an unequal division of
global resources between the wealthy global North and poor South. 41 Because
states most responsible for anthropogenic climate change often have more
resources than poorer states, they are better suited to reduce risks and adapt.42
cannot shield even the wealthiest nations
However, risk reduction and adaptation
43
loss.
related
change
climate
all
from
Violent conflicts stemming from the effects of climate change, threaten global
peace and security. 44 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, "Make no mistake:
The implications here extend well beyond hunger. This isn't only about global
food security; it's about global security-period. '' 5 Land degradation from

38. Field, supranote 5, at 20-22
39. Rajendra K. Pachauri et. al., Climate Change 2014: Syntheses Report, IPCC 16 (2015),
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYRAR5_FNAL-full.pdf.
40. Id. at 16, 20 (population growth also challenge risk management because more people are
reliant on available natural resources for survival).
41. Anne McNevin, Beyond Territoriality:Rethinking Human Mobility, Border Security And
GeopoliticalSpace From the IndonesianIsland of Bintan, 45(3) SECURITY DIALOGUE 295, 299 (2014),
(discussing
http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/04/23/0967010614530458.full.pdf+html
historical European colonialism, global trade, and exploitation of natural resources).
42. Hurricane Sandy by the Numbers, FEMA (recovery and mitigation numbers as of Oct. 9,
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/14460420821952015),
179d93ald9f3ca512de588ebf4091336/Sandyanniv3 by the numbers.pdf. The Federal government
has provided at least $13 billion to assist victims of the storm. Additional $2.5 Billion in Federal
Hurricane Sandy Aid Coming, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (May 23, 2014), available at
http://www.pressofatianticcity.com/news/breaking/additional-billion-in-federal-hurricane-sandy-aidcoming/articlef9lbcb6c-e2b8-1 le3-9edb-001 a4bcf887a.html.
43. Nicholas Stem, The Economics of Climate Change, 98 AM. ECON. REv. 5 (2008), available at
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=l 0.1257/aer.98.2.1 (climate change costs are the equivalent to
5% of global GDP).
44. Clionadh Raleigh et. al., Assessing the Impact of Climate Change On Migration and Conflict,
at v, 34, 36 (SOC. DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, WBG, Working Paper, 2008),
http://danida.vnu.edu.vn/cpis/files/References/Climate%20Change/Assessing/2Othe%20mpact%2Oof
%20Climate%2OChange%20on%20Migration%20and%20Conflict.pdf. [hereinafter Raleigh].
45. Matthew Lee, Climate Change, Food Security Key to Global Stability, Kerry Says,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 17, 2015), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/climate-
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unsustainable land use and extreme weather events lead to food insecurity, disrupts
livelihoods, and drives people into urban areas.46 Many displaced by climate
change relocate within their home state. 47 Migration into urban areas increases
competition for already scarce resources and can challenge already fragile
governments.48
Conflicts stemming from the symptoms of climate change
contribute to large-scale migration from the global South and developing regions,
to the North. 49 At the COP21, President Obama said that the effects of climate
change will lead to "[p]olitical disruptions that trigger new conflict, and even more
floods of desperate peoples seeking the sanctuary of nations not their own."' 50 In
this way climate change is a "threat multiplier." 51 President Obama later said:
The reason is because this one trend-climate change-affects all
trends. If we let the world keep warming as fast as it is, and sea levels
rising as fast as they are, and weather patterns keep shifting in more
unexpected ways-then before long, we are going to have to devote
more and more and more of our economic and military resources not to
growing opportunity for our people, but to adapting to the various
consequences of a changing planet. This is an economic and security
52
imperative that we have to tackle now."
Climate change is linked to economic and social disruption, which can create
53
environments ripe for recruitment by extremist groups like ISIL, and others.
Years of severe drought and poor water management in Syria led to total crop
failure in the country's main agricultural region and eighty-five percent loss of
livestock.5 4 The loss of livelihoods forced families to migrate to already
overcrowded cities, whose presence added to existing grievances with the

change-food-security-key-global-stability-kerry-says/ (writing on about the speech Secretary Kerry
gave at the Milan Expo in 2015).
46. Urgendav. Staat,supra note 34, at 14, 26.
47. U.N. High Comm'r For Refugees, UNHCR, the Environment & Climate Change 8 (Oct.
2015), http://www.unhcr.org/540854f49.html [hereinafter UNHCR].
48. Raleigh, supra note 44, at 5-6, 34-6 (linking climate migration to urban areas and conflict).
49. Id. at 2, 6.
50. Remarks by PresidentObama at the FirstSession of COP21, supranote 15.
51. FINDINGS FROM SELECT FEDERAL REPORTS: THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATION OF A
CHANGING
CLIMATE,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
WASHINGTON
8
(May
2015),
https://m.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/National-Security-Implications of ChangingClimat

eFinal_051915.pdf, see also Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2011/15
(July
20,
2011),
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2011/15.
52. Office of the Press Secretary, Press Conference by President Obama, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Dec. 1, 2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/01 /press-conferencepresident-obama.
53. Phillip Dane Warren, Climate Change and InternationalPeace and Security: PossibleRoles
for the U.N. Security Council in Addressing Climate Change, SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L.,
COLUM.
L.
SCH.
4-5
(July
2015),
available
at
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac: 187331.
54. Case Study Syria, A NEW CLIMATE FOR PEACE, https://www.newclimateforpeace.org/case-

study/syria (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
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government.5" Without the resources to adapt to a changing environment, many
people move into urban areas within their home state. 56 Urban migration exposes
displaced individuals to increased risks and threats to safety and livelihood (e.g.,
forced labor, human trafficking, and violent conflict).5 7 It also increases
competition for natural resources and strains existing public services. 58 For
instance, in Egypt issues of food security related to changes in rainfall patterns
added to already existing food insecurity. 59 Mass protests in Egypt during 2011
were largely driven by public objection to increased poverty, soaring food prices,
corruption, and high unemployment. 60 Egyptians are quite sensitive to food price
volatility because the average Egyptian household spends over forty percent 6' of
their incomes on food. Water scarcity in the region and low agriculture production
has led to soaring food prices. 62 These protests eventually led to the fall of the
thirty-year regime of Hosni Mubarak.63 The situation in Egypt, along with many
others, demonstrated that climate change and environmental displacement can and
do lead to instability which threatens global peace and security. However, despite
the significant issues associated with the migration of persons displaced by climate
change, do current international legal instruments recognize the rights of the
environmentally displaced? The next part of this section will answer this question.
II.

B. GAPS INPROTECTION, ENVIRONMENTALLY DISPLACED
OF HARM.

INDIVIDUALS ARE VULNERABLE TO INCREASED RISK

As described above, individuals adapting to a changing climate are more
likely to move within their home state. 64 The Guiding Principles on Internal
55. Id.
56. Raleigh, supra note 44, at 20.
57.
Armed

Henrik Urdal, Demographic Aspects of Climate Change, Environmental DegradationAnd
Jan.
2008),
Oslo,
Inst.
Res.
4-7
(Peace
Conflict

http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Henrik Urdal/publication/228801794 Demographic aspects of cl
imate change environmental degradation and armed conflict/links/Ofcfd5Ob32baa21d89000000.pdf.
58. Colin P. Kelley et. al., supra note 10, at 3241-42 (referring to a nearly 50% increased urban
population in Syria between 2002 and 2010, as a contributor to the country's destabilization).
59. Food Security And Nutritional Status In Egypt Worsening Amidst Economic Challenges,
(May 21, 2013), available at https://www.wfp.org/news/newsWORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

release/food-security-and-nutritional-status-egypt-worsening-amidst-economic-challenges.
60. Case Study Egypt, A NEW CLIMATE FOR PEACE, https://www.newclimateforpeace.org/casestudy/egypt (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
61. Id.; see also Derek Thompson, How Families Spend in Brazil, Russia, China, India, Egypt,
Turkey, Indonesia, And Saudi Arabia, TuE ATLANTIC (Sept. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/how-families-spend-in-brazil-russia-china-india-

egypt-turkey-indonesia-and-saudi-arabia/263023/ (citing 50% of the household income).
62. Water Scarcity in Egypt: The Urgent Need for Regional CooperationAmong the Nile Basin
Countries 2, GOV'T OF EGYPT MINISTRY OF WATER RES. & IRRIGATION 2 (Feb. 2014),
http://www.mfa.gov.eg/SiteCollectionDocuments/Egypt / 20Water/20Resources%20Paper 2014.pdf
63. Essam SharafNamed Egypt's New Prime Minister, THE WORLD POST (Mar. 3, 2011, updated
on May 25, 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/03/essam-sharaf-named-

egypts n_831029.html.
64.

INTERNAL

DISPLACEMENT

MONITORING

CTR.,

Q.

UPDATE

3

(July-Sept.

2015),

http://www.intemal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/IDMC-quarterly-update-2015-QU3.pdf
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Displacement ("GPID") is a soft law instrument that does not create positive
obligations on states for displaced individuals. It recognizes individuals displaced
by human-made disasters, 65 but only applies to individuals fleeing from sudden
onset disasters without addressing the specific needs of those vulnerable to climate
change. 66 This leaves a gap in protection for those internally displaced from the
more common slow onset environmental degradation scenarios related to climate
change.67
For those displaced individuals who are not fleeing from sudden onset
disasters, seeking refugee status may provide some protections. Environmental
migrants, who can prove a recognized form of past persecution or well-founded
fear of future harm on account of five specific categories, may obtain "refugee"
69
status. 68 Refugee status might enable the individual to permanently reoae
relocate.
Unlike soft instruments such as the GPID, binding international law creates
positive obligations on states to protect refugees. However, to be granted refugee
status, a person must demonstrate that they were persecuted.70 Domestic
jurisprudence continues to narrow the scope of the defined categories of
persecution, and does not make room for the environmentally displaced . 7y There is
a strong nexus between human activity and climate change,7 2 but courts have ,et to
define the direct impacts of climate change as a form of persecution. 73 In addition,
(19.3 million newly displaced people in 2014).
65. U.N. Rep. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, at Annex 2,
U.N.
Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2
(Feb.
11,
1998),
available
at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c3da07f7.html; see also African Union Convention for the Protection
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), Art. 1(k), Oct. 22,
2009, 49 I.L.M. 86, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ae572d82.html (human-made disasters
like wars, industrial accidents, fires).
66. Lauren Nishimura, 'Climate Change Migrants':Impediments to a ProtectionFramework And
the Need to Incorporate MigrationInto Climate Change Adaptation Strategies, 27 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
107, 115 (2015), available at http://ijrl.oxfordjoumals.org/content/early/2015/02/1 1/ijrl.eevO02.abstract.
67. Taylor Ackerman, Climate Change And Forced Migration: A Gap in Protection, PEACE
PALACE LIBR. (July 31, 2015), available at http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/2015/07/climate-changeand-foreced-migration-a-gap-in-protection/.
68. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees]; see UNHCR, supra note 47, at 9 (state practice under the Convention varies. Individuals
trying to establish past persecution on account of the five categories face challenges of changing
requirements and continuiously evolving jurisprudence that makes proving persecution more and more
difficult).
69. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 69; Nishimura, supra note 67, at
114.
70. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 69; Nishimura, supra note 67, at
114.
71. William Thomas Worster, The Evolving Definition of the Refugee in Contemporary
International Law,
30
BERKELEY
J.
INT'L
L.
103-06
(2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1736547.
72. Lisa V. Alexander et. al., Climate Change 2013 The Physical Science Basis, Summary for
policymakers, IPCC, FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, 14 (2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/wgl/WGIAR5_SPMbrochure en.pdf.
73. Kiribati Family 'Terrified' of Going Home, RADIO NEW ZEALAND NEWS (Sept. 22, 2015),
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because of the multi-causal and historical nature of climate change, identifying a
74
specific perpetrator is difficult.

GHG emissions, which contribute to climate

change, have been increasing since the industrial revolution. 75 Although it is
possible to identify specific modem actors, courts have not yet been willing to
assign guilt in cases involving climate change induced displacement. 76 In addition
to the challenge of establishing the element of persecution, courts have also found
that climate migrants do not receive protection under the category of a "particular
social group." 77 Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
("Refugee Convention") 78 and the Convention Against Torture, 79 states also have
an obligation not to return a person to his or her country of origin where removal
would subject the person to serious bodily harm or torture. 80 Yet many states have
failed to protect those persons displaced by climate change, despite the fact that
removal to their country of origin could pose serious risks to their well-being and
possibly, their lives. 8 1 One of the most significant arguments against broadening
the scope of the definition of refugee to include those individuals, who have been
displaced as a result of climate change or environmental disasters, is that it would
divert attention and resources and weaken existing efforts to protect vulnerable

available at http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/284875/kiribati-family-%/ 27terrified / 27-of-goinghome (a recent challenge in New Zealand by a Kiribati family to deportation was denied for not
establishing protection under the Refugee Convention).
74. Benedict Blunnie, Climate ChangeAnd ForcedDisplacement: ConceptualAnd Legal Issues,
available
at
98
(2014),
87,
L.
REV.
INNS
STUDENT
4
KINGS
=
http://heinonline.org/HOULandingPagehandle=hein.joumals/kingsinslr4&div-l 1&id=&page
(studies would require detailed information since the start of the industrial revolution).
75. Pachauri, supra note 39, at 124.
76.
NEW

KELLY BUCHANAN, THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER,
ZEALAND:

"CLIMATE

CHANGE

REFUGEE"

CASE

OVERVIEW

(July

2015),

https://www.loc.gov/law/help/climate-change-refugee/new-zealand-climate-change-refugee-case.pdf.
77. AF (Kiribati)[2013] NZIPT 800413 at [75] (The court rejected the claim of membership of
a "particular social group" because the applicant did not face fear of persecution from a specific actor
but from "mother nature." The court found that there was no evidence that the Government of Kiribati
made a choice not to remedy the situation, and the applicant testified that he faced the same poor
conditions common to everyone in Kiribati.). The drafters of the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("Refugee Convention"), did not define the category of protection for membership in a
particular social group, nor do the travaux preparatories offer interpretive guidance. National courts
and legal scholars indicate interpretation guided by the four listed categories of protection: race,
religion, nationality, and political opinion. An analysis commissioned by the UNIICR indicates that
jurisprudence regarding the interpretation often departs from national legislation and the Refugee
Convention itself. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, "Membership in a ParticularSocial Group ": Analysis
and ProposedConclusions., http://www.unhcr.org/3b83bl c54.pdf.
78. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 69.
79. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/JNTS/Volume%201465/volume-1465-I-24841 -English.pdf.
80. Jane McAdam, International Dialogue on Migration 2011 the Future of Migration: Building
Capacities for Change Intersessional Workshop on Climate Change, Environmental Degradationand
Migration (Mar. 29-30, 2011) (Human rights law has helped expand traditional protection).
81. Id.
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82
individuals currently covered by the Refugee Convention.
Binding international law instruments require parties to develop domestic
policies that originate from a state's commitment to the agreement. 83 Once
international agreements are in place, domestic practice and implementation
varies. 4 States find ways to avoid international obligations by externalizing
border security. 85 Border externalization diverts people away from safety and
undermines the spirit and purpose of the refugee convention. 86 The European
migration "crisis" provides an example of this. The EU and Turkey are currently
developing an agreement that would provide incentives to Turkey to prevent
87
millions of migrants from conflict areas from entering the EU from its territory.
Climate displaced persons who are not likely to fit into an existing category of
protection often do not have an opportunity for legal migration when adapting to
environmental degradation across international borders. 88 Without an opportunity
to migrate legally, displaced individuals become vulnerable to exploitation,
increased poverty, political exclusion, and violence. 89 Many who seek resources
and opportunities for a better life across international borders outside the
regulatory norms migrate irregularly. 90 Irregular migrants are more likely to face
political and social exclusion and discrimination because of their lack of proper
documentation, and are therefore more susceptible to exploitation. 9' Because
irregular migrants have limited options for work they are also more likely to be
preyed upon by smugglers and employers who can capitalize on their

82. Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Displacement to Refuge, 25 J ENVTL. L. LITIG. 19, 21
(2010),
available
at
https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/I 794/10643/Burleson.pdf?sequence= 1&isAllo
wed=y.
83. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, openedfor signature May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc.
A/Conf.39/27,
1155
U.N.T.S.
331,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume- 1155-I- 18232-English.pdf.
84. BRIAN GORLICK, IMPROVING DECISION-MAKING IN ASYLUM DETERMINATION, NEW ISSUES IN
REFUGEE
RESEARCH
PAPER
7
(2005),
available
at

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2331704.
85. Maribel Casas-Cortes et al., supranote 11.
86. Maribel Casas-Cortes et al., supra note 11, at 55 (Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs)
with neighboring states and third parties, essentially redefines political borders).
87.

Jennifer Rankin, Turkey outlines "one for one" plan to tackle Syrian refugee crisis, THE

GUARDIAN (2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/07/eu-offers-another-3bn-to-turkeyat-emergency-migration-summit (last visited Apr. 5, 2016).
88. Benoit Mayer, The InternationalLegal Challenges of Climate-Induced Migration:Proposal
for an International Legal Framework, 357 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y , 380-388 (2011),

http://www.colorado.edu/law/sites/default/files/Mayer/20%28Corrected%/o29-S.pdf
89.

GLOBAL MIGRATION GROUP, supranote 89, at 28-32 (migrants without proper documents to

stay in a country, are much more likely than regular migrants to face increasing poverty, forced labor,
political exclusion, and human trafficking).
90. Key Migration Terms, supra note 12.
91.

BEATE ANDREES, FORCED LABOUR AND TRAFFICKING IN EUROPE: HOW PEOPLE ARE TRAPPED

THROUGH
AND
COME
OUT
(International
Labour Office Geneva 2008),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed norm/@declaration/documents/publication/wcms-0905
N,

LIVE

48.pdf.
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vulnerability. 92 Exploitation of irregular migrants can occur through debt bondage,
where individuals become indebted to a smuggler or successive holder of the
debt.93 Forced labor, sexual slavery, and violence are94also likely outcomes for
irregular migrants exploited by smugglers or employers.
For many environmentally displaced individuals there is a risk of becoming
stateless. 95 The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, although
not developed with this type of tragedy in mind, may provide assistance to the
environmentally displaced. 96 A person who is stateless is no longer recognized as
a national by the government. 97 In the context of climate change, a person
becomes stateless when an individual's country of birth disappears or the
98
individual otherwise becomes marginalized and no longer recognized by a state.
The challenges posed by statelessness are particularly acute for SIDS, where rising
ocean levels encroach on low lying coastal areas, and in some cases threaten to
inundate whole countries. 99 For example, many people who live in Kiribati, whose
existence has been threatened by climate change, have relocated to Fiji.10 °
However, the Kiribati government still recognizes those individuals as I-Kiribati
nationals although they are living in Fiji.10 1 Because these persons are still
identified as nationals of their government they cannot be defined as stateless, and
therefore cannot receive any protections afforded to stateless persons under
international law.1 02 As certain states' existences are threatened by climate change,

92. Id. at 32.
93. Id. at 23.
94. UNODC,

COMBATING

VIOLENCE

AGAINST

MIGRANTS

1

(2015),

https://www.unodc.org/documents/j ustice-and-prisonreforn/UNODCCombatingViolence against Migrants.pdf.
95. Chelsea Dixon, The Modern Atlantis: 21st Century Solutions To A Legendary Problem, VT.
L. REV., available at http://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu/staff-note-the-modem-atlantis-21st-centurysolutions-to-a-legendary-problem/.
96. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, June 6, 1960, 360 U.N.T.S. 117,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailslI.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=Vat
available
3&chapter-5&Temp-mtdsg2&lang=en.
97. Id. art. 1.
98. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Climate Change and Statelessness: An
Overview 2 (May 15, 2009), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a2d189d3.html.
99. Id. at 1; see also U.N. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (Dec.
13, 1975).
100. Per Liljas, The People of Kiribati Have Been Offered a Home in Fiji if Rising Seas Swamp
Their Islands, TIMES, (Feb. 12, 2014) available at http://world.time.com/2014/02/12/kiribati-newhome-in-fiji/.
101. Fiji Willing to Help Kiribati From Climate Change Fallout - Bainimarama, RADIO N.Z.
(Dec. 7, 2013), available at http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/230116/fiji-willing-tohelp-kiribati-from-climate-change-fallout-bainimarama.
102. U.N. Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Kiribati, (2014),
http://www.ccig-iccg.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/Kiribati 21 session UPR submission ERIFIWCC.pdf, (referring to the
difficulty for the 1-Kiribati to be recognized as a stateless person, because the definition requires the
stateless person to no longer be considered a national of the state. Thus, requiring an inquiry into when
a state ceases to exist).
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the potential for an increase in stateless persons globally has dire implications.
Climate change has a direct impact on human rights.' 0 3 The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' °4 and The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10 5 among others provide for rights directly
related to climate change (e.g., improvement of environmental and industrial
hygiene, life, work, culture). Environmental degradation caused by climate change
affects people's ability to exercise these rights. In litigation however, courts have
taken differing positions on whether climate change directly impacts the enjoyment
of human rights and what the appropriate remedy should be. A 2014 decision by a
New Zealand court acknowledged that climate change likely impacts the
enjoyment of human rights. 10 6 It declined to reach the question of granting
immigration visas to a family from Tuvalu on the basis of these impacts.' 07 In
2015, the Lahore High Court Green Bench in Pakistan, however, found that
domestic legislation did protect the fundamental rights from further delay
of the
08
country's implementation of its National Climate Policy and Framework. 1
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") could also provide guidance in
relation to the damage caused by climate change and human rights. Petitions by
the governments of Palau, Maldives, and others are requesting the United Nations
General Assembly ("UNGA") to request the ICJ to issue an advisory opinion on
states' and other actors' obligations to future generations regarding climate
change. 1°9 The ICJ has issued an advisory opinion in the past regarding threats to
human safety, in its opinion on the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons."''O The state's request to the UNGA still stands."' ICJ advisory
opinions are not binding," 12 but the ICJ explains:

103.

Center for International Environmental Law [CIEL], Climate Change & Human Rights: A

Primer(2011), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/CC_ HRE 23Mayl 1.pdf.
104. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 1976), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Professionallnterest/cescr.pdf.

105. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
(entered into force 1976), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I14668-English.pdf.
106. AD
(Tuvalu),
[2014]
NZIPT
501370-371,
https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/IPT/Documents/Deportation/pdf/rem_20140604-501370.pdf.

107. Id.
108. Leghari

v. Federation

of Pakistan

(2015), Case No WP No 255012015

(Pak.)

http://edigest.elaw.org/sites/default/files/pk.leghari.091415.pdf.
109. DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, CLIMATE CHANGE & THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 9-18,
(Yale
Center
for
Envtl.
L.
&
Pol'y,
2013),
available
at

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract-id=2309943 (explaining that the UNGA is empowered
to request the ICJ to issue advisory opinions).
110. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. GL No 95
(Jul. 8, 1996), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf.

111. Phillip Sands, Climate Change and The Rule of Law: Adjudicatingthe Future in International
Law,
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/professor-sands-lecture-on-climate-change-and-the-rule-oflaw.pdf (stating that Professor Sands supports the UNGA to make an official request to the ICJ).
112. Advisory Jurisdiction, I.C.J, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.phppl=5&p2=2

visited Apr. 25, 2016).
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Although without binding effect, the advisory opinions of the Court
nevertheless carry great legal weight and moral authority. They are
often an instrument of preventive diplomacy and have peace-keeping
virtues. Advisory opinions also, in their way, contribute to the
elucidation and development of international law and thereby to the
[The ICJ's, decisions
strengthening of peaceful relations between States.
3
could have a lasting effect on climate justice]."
International and domestic courts have in many cases declined to address4
climate change related claims because of "political questions" contained therein."
One such case is one in which, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a
claim by a Native American village, who were alleging global warming, caused by
fossil fuel companies, harmed them. 115 The claim was dismissed because to
"adjudicate its claims, the Ninth Circuit would have to determine the point at
which greenhouse gas emissions become excessive without guidance from the
political branches." 16 The Ninth Circuit also found that the petitioner did not have
standing because they could not produce facts linking the petitioner's injuries to
the actions of the defendants who were 8 fossil fuel companies." 7 The U.S.
Supreme Court also later denied certiorari."
Momentum within the international legal community is shifting, however, as
courts begin to address climate justice directly. " 9 Global awareness of the dangers
of climate change is widespread as indicated by the 24,000 government and nongovernmental observers who participated at COP2 1.120 The 196 parties who
voluntarily committed to reducing GHG emissions indicates global consensus on
that single issue.' 2 1 If deferred to by domestic and international judicial bodies,
climate science produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
("IPCC") and others scientific bodies would relieve the courts of having to make
factual findings related to climate change attribution. 112 The Fifth Assessment
Report of the IPCC stressed that the "Human influence on the climate system is

113. Id.
114. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 696 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2013).
115. See id.
116. Id. at 854.
117. Id. at 855.
118. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 81
U.S.L.W. 3649 (U.S. May 20, 2013) (No. 12-1072).
119. See generally Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption: Climate
Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report, INT'L BAR ASS'N (Sept. 22, 2014), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=A25BC045-B6F9-4E05-BDI 7E2E9FB14EAD9 (the International Bar Association supports climate change justice, for example,
through the International Court of Justice, and other arbitral bodies).
5:20 PM),
(April
8, 2015,
120. See Participation and Accreditation, U.N.,
http://newsroom.unfccc.int/cop2l parisinformationhub/cop-21 cmp- 11-information-hub-participationand-accreditation/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
121. HistoricPairs Agreement on Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS, (April 8. 2015, 5:20 PM),
availableat http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/finale-cop21/.
122. Field, supranote 5, at 12.
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clear."' 123 Because of the nexus between human actors and climate change, it is
important for courts to start holding actors responsible for climate change
accountable. A notable case that illustrates this very outcome is discussed in the
proceeding section.
III.

A. A POLITICAL QUESTION ANSWERED, WHERE THE LEGISLATURE
HAS BEEN Too SLOW TO ACT ON THE URGENCY OF CLIMATE
CHANGE

Where governments fail to act on agreed emissions targets or fail to act on
climate change in spite of public support, states become ruled by diktat and not
democracy. 24 Some recent climate justice cases reflect that the global judiciary
has declined to address climate justice claims either by invoking the political
question doctrine or out of fear of opening the floodgates to litigation. 25 But the
global judiciary represents a critical role in addressing climate change because the
judiciary has a long history of significant contributions aimed at creating policy
change in other areas that affect human rights. 126 Climate change as a human
rights issue 127 is not different from social and political movements in the past.
Consider the evolution of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. During
the Civil Rights Movements, elected officials in the federal government stalled in
taking action to address policies of racial segregation and inequality in the face of
social unrest and overwhelming public want. The Supreme Court's 1954 ruling
Brown v. Board of Education'28 preceded the civil rights bills of 1957 129and
132
13
1960.130 The Supreme Court decision ' against the Defense of Marriage Act
reflected the growing social support for marriage equality against the will of the
legislature. Writing on the topic of judicial activism, Peter Irons performed a
historical survey of cases where the U.S. judiciary in fact responded to political
questions with an answer, not a dismissal. 133 He wrote, "functional flaws in the

123. Id.
124. Rebecca Lowe, Climate Justice: Lawyers Make a Stand, INT'L BAR ASS'N (Oct. 15, 2015)

(NGO ClientEarth CEO James Thornton explains his organization's argument in suit against the
European Union (EU) for missing its targets on nitrogen dioxide. "Our argument is, if the government
can just choose whether it abides by laws or not then we no longer have a democracy under the rule of
law.
It's
rule
by
threat
and
diktat."),
available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=B34332B6-8310-42BB-A3AD-9D39320D8AFF.

125. See generally id.; see also, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina, supranote 115.
126. See Matt Grossmann & Brendon Swedlow, Judicial Contributions to US National Policy
Change since 1945, 3 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COURTS 1-35, 17 (2015) (arguing US courts have had a
significant indirect and direct effect on policy making in all branches of the government),
http://matthewg.org/judicialcontrib.pdf.
127. CIEL, supra note 104.
128.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
39 (1988)

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 348 U.S. 886, 886 (1954).

The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (2012).
The Civil Rights Act of 1960, 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012).
United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2682-720 (2013).
The Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1996).
Peter H. Irons, Making Law: The Casefor Judicial Activism, 23 VAL. UNIV. L. REV. 35-52,
(referring to civil rights cases, where the legislature failed to respond to public momentum to
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political system leads me to argue that judicial activism is an essential antidote to
some of the toxins that have poisoned that system."' 134 The urgency to address the
problems posed by climate change compels the same level of judicial activism.
Climate change litigation in U.S. domestic courts and international courts has
so far involved claims such as the common-law tort claim of nuisance, 135 duty of
care, 13 6 and public trust doctrine. 37 Until recently, climate justice claims brought
in the U.S. have been dismissed. 138 The section below will first discuss a recent
decision by a Dutch court finding in favor of the petitioner against the Dutch
government's failure to maintain the duty of care prescribed for by the Constitution
of the Netherlands. 39 It will then discuss pending lawsuits filed in the U.S states
of Oregon and Washington.

B. THlE

III.

URGENDA CASE

In Urgenda, the Urgenda Foundation and nearly 900 co-plaintiffs filed suit
against the Dutch government for not taking sufficient action to reduce its GHG
emissions, alleging that the Dutch government knew that inaction would cause
harm to its current and future citizens.' 40 The plaintiffs did not ask for damages,
but rather asked for the government to reduce its GHG emissions to forty percent
below the 1990 levels by 2020.141
The court in Urgenda considered three main questions: (1) the severity of
alleged danger of climate change, and what reductions are necessary to avert the
danger; (2) whether the Netherlands has a legal obligation to the Urgenda
Foundation and co-plaintiffs to take further reductions measures in the face of the
danger posed; and (3) is the court the appropriate institution to decide this issue. 142
The Dutch government did not dispute the attribution science and the
scientific findings by the IPCC and other international organizations (i.e., United
Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP") and the International Energy Agency
("IEA")). Nor did the state dispute findings by Dutch national agencies.1 43 This

end segregation), available at http://scholar.valpo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2033&context-vulr.
134. Id.
135. An Overview of Nuisance, LAWS.COM, (April 8, 2015, 11:45 PM) (nuissance is harm arising

from one's use of property), available at http://tort.laws.com/nuisance.
136.

Roger Cox, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, A Climate Change

Litigation Precedent: Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands 4, (Nov. 2015),
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigipaper 79.pdf
7,
2015), available at
INFO. INST.,
(Nov.
137. Public Trust Doctrine, LEGAL

https://www.law.comell.edu/wex/public-trust-doctrine.
138. See generally U.S. Climate Change Litigation Chart, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
COLUMBIA

LAW

SCH.,

(Sept.

11,

2015),

available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-

change/resources/us-climate-change-litigation-chart.
139. Urgenda v. Staat, supra note 34.
(April
140. Climate Case, URGENDA,
http://www.urgenda.nl/en/climate-case/.
141. Id.
142. Cox, supra note 137, at 6.
143. Urgenda v. Staat, supra note 34.

9,

2015,

12:17

AM),

available

at
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allowed the court to defer to the attribution science to respond to the first question.
The scientific findings make clear that if global warming exceeds two degrees
Celsius to preindustrial levels, the environment will be highly hazardous to
humans. 144 The court found that it is necessary to stabilize GHG emissions by
reducing human GHG emissions, and that the government's current policy of
seventeen percent reduction was not sufficient to avoid the danger. 145 The court
found that at least a twenty-five to forty percent reduction of 1990 emissions levels
were necessary by 2020.146
Responding to the duty of care owed to the Urgenda plaintiffs, the court did
not find that the State owed a duty of care to the Urgenda plaintiffs based on the
148
Dutch Constitution' 47 or the European Convention on Human Rights
("ECHR"). 149 However, the court did find that the as a signatory to the UNFCCC,
the Netherlands and other signatories' reductions targets were "insufficient to
realize the two degrees Celsius target."' 15 This insufficiency could have dangerous
consequences to both humans and the environment. 15" Because the government is
crucial in the transition to a "more sustainable society," it has a significant
responsibility to establish an adequate and effective statutory and instrumental
framework to reduce GHG emission in the Netherlands. 152 Considering the
principle of fairness and costs associated with further reductions or maintaining the
current policy, the court found that taking immediate action on further reductions
are far more cost effective. 53 The court did not apply a traditional "but for"
causation analysis, but found a "sufficient causal link" between the GHG
emissions from the Netherlands and global climate change. 154 The fact that Dutch
emissions are limited on a global
scale does not change that Dutch emissions
55
contribute to climate change.'
As to the third question, the court decided its own role in climate policy.
While the state argued that climate policy was political and did not belong to the
court, the court found that its role is to provide legal protection and settles legal
disputes. 5 6 Because Urgenda's claim concerns the legal protection provided by
the state, "it therefore requires a judicial review."' 5 7 The political power of the
state is not diminished by the court's decision, because the state retains full power
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149.
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151.
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IPCC, supranote 38, at 12.
Urgenda v. Stat, supra note 34.
Id.
Gw. [Constitution].
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 2, art. 8, Sept. 3, 1953, C.E.T.S. 149.
Id.
Urgenda v. Staat, supra note 34.

Cox, supranote 137, at 11.
Urgenda v. Staat, supranote 34, at 4.66, 4.74.
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Id.at 4.79, 4.90.
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to decide how to comply with the order. 158 The court found that it was necessary
for the State to reduce emissions at a minimum of twenty-five percent of 1990
levels by 2020.159 Although the Dutch government is appealing the decision based
on the State's duty of care, it is complying with the
on the court's decision
60
reduction order. 1
This case is significant in that it could provide a model for future climate
justice cases deciding a state's obligation to its citizens in relation to its
international obligations.161 Attribution science played a major role in the court's
decision of the risk of danger to human from increasing global temperatures. 162
Also significant is the duty of care owed by the state in such cases. In the Urgenda
decision, the court looked to the Dutch Constitution as well as, other international
agreements.1 63 Finding a duty of care from the international law "no harm"
principle, and from the State's individual commitment under the UNFCC and
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). 164
Because states have not adequately responded to climate change, the
judiciary's role in mitigating climate change is becoming more important. 165 A
case based on similar claims is currently pending against Belgium in The Court of
First Instance in Brussels. 166 In the U.S. state of Washington, eight youths
petitioned the King County Superior Court and the Washington Department of
Ecology to write carbon emissions rules that would protect the atmosphere and the
future generations. 167 As of November 2015, the Judge in the court ordered the
Washington Department of Ecology to write such rules because "very survival
depends upon the will of their elders to act now, decisively and unequivocally, to
stem the tide of global warming."' 68 In late 2015, Greenpeace Southeast Asia and
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement filed a petition asking the Philippines
Human Rights Commission ("CHR") to investigate and acknowledge the
investor-owned fossil fuel companies in causing extreme
complicity of fifty
69
weather events."
158. Id. at4.101.
159. Id. at 4.93.
160. Cabinet Begins Implementation of Urgenda Ruling but will File Appeal, GOVERNMNET OF
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writing).
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The President of the IBA said during the COP2 1 that arbitration would play
an increasingly important role "in encouraging business and government
commitments on climate change and sustainability by providing an effective
mechanism to resolve disputes."1' 70 The effect arbitration will have on climate
justice is highly dependent on the arbitration clause contained within the
agreement being interpreted by an arbitral tribunal. 171 Agreements to arbitrate will
guide the tribunal's analysis and likely include the specific remedies available. For
instance, a claim was brought by an investor against Barbados under the CanadaBarbados Bilateral Trade Agreement ("BIT"), which limits the tribunal to award
money damages or restitution due to expropriation,' 72 for failing to implement and
enforce environmental protections under its domestic and international
obligations. 173 The claims concern the state's obligations to an international treaty
and its own domestic law.' 74 This particular agreement does not give the tribunal
75
authority to force Barbados to implement or enforce environmental regulations.'
Because international arbitration typically involves violations of international law
under relevant treaties, tribunals can advance climate change mitigation through
interpretation of the relevant law.
III.

C. THE

FUTURE OF CLIMATE JUSTICE

Climate change is an urgent global problem that will continue to have a
severe impact on the environment, people, economies, and governments. The
impact of climate change is not limited to the most vulnerable people who live in
low lying costal zones 176 or who directly depend on natural resources for
livelihoods.' 77 Climate change has a widespread impact globally, and disrupts
http://www.greenpeace.org/intemationa/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/Climate-Justice-PhilippinesHuman-Rights-Commission-Exxoniblog/54690/ (a copy of the Complaint can be found here
http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/105904/Climate-Change-and-Human-RightsComplaint.pdf).
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2015),
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http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=5bac3a2d-de37-4d69-992a-aa974fb4fabb.
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better environment, ATTRIBUTION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (May 29,

2015), http://isdsblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/08/Magnusson-Warsaw-29-May-2015.pdf
(Annette Magnusson is the SCC Secretary General).
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available

at

http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/280.
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1971,
996
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245,
http://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/ibrary/scan certified e.pdf.
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agricultural production, forces people from their homes, and compounds civil and
conditions affect the price of food and threaten global
political strife. 178 1These
79
peace and security.

Prior to the Urgenda decision, courts were reluctant to address climate change
in any real way. 180 To ensure continued functioning of global systems, such as
global trade, a concerted approach to climate justice is required. International
response to mitigating climate change should not simply be left in the hands of the
politicians and business leaders alone. Climate justice and the rule of law can
speed up regulatory measures and put pressure on legislatures and private actors
for higher GHG emissions reductions. Climate justice can also add to new and
developing ways of improving global environmental uses and human rights.
The international legal community is taking an increasingly active role to
initiate policy change with climate justice. Is ' Another example of this active role
comes from the drafting of The Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change
Obligations ("Principles") released in March of 2015.'182 The Principles were
drafted by international attorneys, jurists, and academics, which identify existing
law and provide legal means to compel countries and non-state actors to limit
GHG emissions. 183 These Principles and other documents (e.g., the IBA Climate
Task Force Report, the PA) contribute to enhance the knowledge of international
and domestic courts and tribunals about climate justice and the importance of their
role in achieving it. The Urgenda decision adds the evolving international
jurisprudence and is a sign that blanket dismissals of climate related claims are
becoming a thing of the past. The political question doctrine as applied to climate
justice is likely to fall out of use as judiciaries become more exposed to science
and the claims science supports.
Legal systems continue to evolve to the changing needs of the people and
environment they serve. The goals of the civil rights movement were not achieved
by a single case. Given the scope of the damages presented by climate changed,
we cannot expect that a favorable ruling in a single climate justice case will result
in the recognition and protection of the rights of the environmentally displaced and
the protection of natural resources for future generations. Still, the decision in
Urgenda presents an important step forward. In Urgenda, the state did not dispute
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the science submitted by the IPCC and relied on by the UNFCCC. 184 This made it
easier for the court to defer to the science presented by the IPCC without having to
make a lengthy finding of fact or dismissing the claim on political question
issue. 18 5 Additionally, Urgenda did not seek damages, which alleviated the court
of the need to attribute harm to a specific perpetrator.1 86 Relying on international
commitments to reduce GHG emissions and the Netherlands' Constitution, the
court was able to find that the Dutch government had a duty of care.' 87 Following
Urgenda, a lawsuit was filed against the U.S. Federal Government in the U.S. state
of Oregon in the U.S. District Court of Oregon, against the federal government for
its failure to protect their constitutional rights of life, liberty, and property by
promoting the development and use of fossil fuels and for failing to protect the
public trust.' 88 The court is currently hearing oral arguments by fossil fuel
company representatives to dismiss the claims.1 89 These cases are significant in
carrying the momentum for climate justice, as they all carry the potential of
mitigating climate change while recognizing human and constitutional rights
provided domestically and internationally.
Existing international investment agreements ("IIAs") should also be
reviewed by the parties to make sure the HAs contain language that both allows
states to regulate environmental matters necessary to mitigate climate change while
respecting human rights. IIAs should also allow for investors to request arbitral
proceedings to hold states accountable for failing to implement environmental and
human rights protections. The overwhelming participation by international leaders
and non-governmental observers during the COP21 indicate that more people than
ever, are concerned with mitigating climate change. This momentum is likely to
strengthen climate justice litigation and arbitration claims, because the world
supports climate justice.
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